Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny. By Joshua Muravchik, American Enterprise Institute (1991) ISSN 0–8447–3734–8. $12.95.
Generals in the Palacio. By Roderick Ai Camp. Oxford University Press, (1992), ISBN 0–19–507300–2, £45.
L'Armement en France. Genèse, Ampleur et Coût d'une Industrie By François Chesnais and Claude Serfati, Editions Nathan, Collection Economie/Sciences Sociales, Paris (1992), ISBN 2–09–190086–9.
The Têt Offensive. Intelligence Failure in War. By James Wirtz, Cornell University Press, New York (1991), ISBN 0–8014–2486–0. $38.50.
Restructuring of arms producton in Western Europe. Edited by Michael Brzoska and Peter Lock. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1992), ISBN 0–1982–9147–7. £25.00.
What is Proper Soldiering? A study of new perspectives for the future uses of the Armed Forces of the 1990s. By Michael Harbottle. The Centre for International Peacebuilding, Chipping Norton (1992), £3.50.
The Strategic Defence Initiative By Edward Reiss, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1992), ISBN 0–521–41097–5. £30.00. 相似文献
Inspection procedures may at times pose a hazard to the system being monitored. In this article, a simple hazardous-inspection model is considered. The character of the optimal ongoing inspection policy (for inspections subsequent to the first) is reviewed, and the possible forms of the optimal initiation policy are established. Efficient computational procedures are developed for calculating optimal policies. Some discussion is included of the counterintuitive nature of some of the results. 相似文献
We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each associated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player‐specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these games are not necessarily convex, do have non‐empty cores, and are totally balanced. The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm‐Bawerk horse market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation. 相似文献